Nutrigenomics, individualism and public health by Chadwick, Ruth
The Summer Meeting of the Nutrition Society was held at King’s College, London on 7–10 July 2003
Plenary Lecture
Nutrigenomics, individualism and public health
Ruth Chadwick
Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, Lancaster,
Lancashire LA1 4SH, UK
Issues arising in connection with genes and nutrition policy include both nutrigenomics and
nutrigenetics. Nutrigenomics considers the relationship between specifc nutrients or diet and
gene expression and, it is envisaged, will facilitate prevention of diet-related common diseases.
Nutrigenetics is concerned with the effects of individual genetic variation (single nucleotide
polymorphisms) on response to diet, and in the longer term may lead to personalised dietary
recommendations. It is important also to consider the surrounding context of other issues such
as novel and functional foods in so far as they are related to genetic modification. Ethical issues
fall into a number of categories: (1) why nutrigenomics? Will it have important public health
benefits? (2) questions about research, e.g. concerning the acquisition of information about
individual genetic variation; (3) questions about who has access to this information, and its
possible misuse; (4) the applications of this information in terms of public health policy, and
the negotiation of the potential tension between the interests of the individual in relation to,
for example, prevention of conditions such as obesity and allergy; (5) the appropriate ethical
approach to the issues, e.g. the moral difference, if any, between therapy and enhancement in
relation to individualised diets; whether the ‘technological fix’ is always appropriate, especially
in the wider context of the purported lack of public confidence in science, which has special
resonance in the sphere of nutrition.
Nutrigenomics: Ethical issues: Individualism: Public health
As society goes further down the path of grappling with
the issues of the post-genome era, the relationship between
genetics and diet is becoming increasingly central. The
Department of Health (2003) White Paper, Our Inheritance,
Our Future: Realising the Potential of Genetics in the
NHS, states that: ‘We will learn more about the genetic
features of common diseases such as heart disease and
diabetes and the way external factors such as diet and
smoking interact with our genes to increase the likelihood
of developing a given disease . . . There will then be the
option to test people for a predisposition to disease, or a
higher than normal risk. Treatment, lifestyle advice and
monitoring aimed at disease prevention could then be
tailored appropriately to suit each individual’.
The particular concern considered in the present paper
relates to the interaction between diet and genes. Here
the issues of nutrigenomics and nutrigenetics arise.
Nutrigenomics refers to the application of genomics in
nutrition research, enabling associations to be made between
specific nutrients and genetic factors, e.g. the way in which
foods or food ingredients influence gene expression.
Nutrigenetics is the study of individual differences at the
genetic level influencing response to diet. These individual
differences may be at the level of single nucleotide
polymorphisms (variations in a single base pair) rather
than at the gene level. Nutrigenomics should facilitate
greater understanding of how nutrition affects metabolic
pathways and how this process goes awry in diet-related
diseases. It is envisaged that nutrigenetics may lead to
individualised dietary advice (Mu¨ller & Kersten, 2003).
It is important to consider the context in which the
discussion takes place. First, it is by now commonplace to
refer to the anxiety attached to public perceptions of
genetics, which has been particularly prominent in the food
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arena, as opposed to the medical arena. Indeed, it was
public response to GM food that was at least partly
responsible for the attention now paid to public engage-
ment and participation. Second, the issues have to be
considered not only in relation to contemporary public
attitudes, but also in relation to the prevailing ethical para-
digms, which are predominantly concerned with individ-
ualism and choice, rather than with the common or public
good. Expression of these considerations is found, for
example, in relation to debates about labelling and
consumer choice.
Applications: ethical issues
Nutrigenomics and nutrigenetics might be involved in
public health strategies to reduce the incidence of diseases
in which diet plays a part, and in individual consultations
to achieve particular targets, e.g. to avoid allergy or
obesity. There may also be applications not integrally
connected with health; sportspersons, for example, may
want to achieve specific targets with diet. The present
paper, however, is primarily concerned with public and
individual health. There are ethical issues associated with
both these aspects, in relation to genetic testing, the control
of the information acquired and its use (who has access to
the information and what interests need to be protected)
and the potential implications for understanding the
relationship between individuals and their food. First, there
is the question of whether it is worthwhile going down
this route, given that any line of research has associated
opportunity costs. Is there sufficient reason to think that
nutrigenetics and nutrigenomics will deliver?
In other contexts critics have been dubious about the
publicity that has surrounded developments in genetics,
and they have argued that putting so much emphasis on
genetic solutions in health care is neglecting other ‘lower-
tech’ solutions to health-care problems. This argument
may be justified, particularly in the case of food. While
much is promised from the development of pharmaco-
genetics in health care, there is a crucial difference between
pharmaceuticals and foods. Pharmaceuticals are well-
defined compounds aimed at specific targets, whereas
foods are complex substances that have multiple effects on
different pathways in the body (Mu¨ller & Kersten, 2003).
There are difficult issues about the size of the studies that
will need to be carried out in order to obtain meaningful
information, and about interpreting them in the light of
queries about the statistical significance of information
obtained from population genetic research (Ioannidis, 2003).
These considerations give rise to considerable uncertainty
over the potential relevance of nutrigenomic research for
public health.
On the individual level, there are questions about the
extent to which individuals will want personalised dietary
advice. Although there have been some moves in this
direction (Sciona, 2003), the decisions an individual makes
about what to eat are arguably much more complex than
the decisions about following a doctor’s prescription of a
pharmaceutical. These decisions are influenced to a greater
extent by factors such as anticipated pleasure. Perhaps,
however, the potential for making advice specific to an
individual’s genetic makeup would prove attractive.
Milunsky (2001), for example, has argued that genetic
information is a mechanism of individual empowerment:
‘While rapid progress continues, there is much you can
do now for yourself and loved ones. Know your family
history, be cognizant of your ethnic origin, determine your
genetic susceptibilities, opt for necessary gene tests, take
preventative actions, establish appropriate surveillance,
and seek preemptive treatment where applicable. In this
way, you can exercise control over your genetic destiny,
secure your health and – in more ways than you yet realise
– save your life.’
While Milunsky (2001) does not refer to diet in this
passage, it is easy to see how the individualist position
outlined here could apply in the context of nutrition,
especially where food is viewed essentially instrumentally,
i.e. as body ‘fuel’. Some individuals will probably regard
the new possibilities in this positive light, while others will
be less keen. Also, there are clear resource implications
over the provision of the testing facility. The White Paper
(Department of Health, 2003) envisages an expanded role
for pharmacists in participating in genetic testing. The
potential impact of genetics on the professional roles of
nutritionists should also be considered.
What will be the drivers in this field? Clearly, there are
commercial interests at stake, and the potential increase
in companies marketing genetic tests direct to the public
should be considered. There have been understandable
concerns about quality control in this area (Advisory
Committee on Genetic Testing, 1997; Chadwick &
Hedgecoe, 2002; Human Genetics Commission, 2002).
Beyond commercialisation, professional or self-referral of
individuals has to be considered.
Milunsky (2001) takes an individualist position. Genetic
tests are presented as giving individuals the information to
make improvements in their own life and health prospects.
Ironically, however, the more individualised the promises
of genetics, the more that collective action is required in
the form of population-based research, in order to acquire
the information to enable the discernment of the differ-
ences at genetic level between individuals that will affect
their susceptibilities. Thus, individual and public health are
integrally connected.
This issue is important because the growth in interest in
population-based genetic research gives rise to questions
specifically about the predominance of individualistic
paradigms in ethics. If there are new paradigms in science,
following the completion of the human genome, and new
paradigms in medicine and nutrition, then why not in
ethics? It is important to be alive to this possibility in
considering ethics and nutrigenomics.
Acquisition of nutrigenomic information
In the medical context, association studies may be of
different kinds. There are studies on isolated populations,
as in the case of Iceland, where the population database
programme aims to establish associations between genetic
factors and common disease. Also, there are proposals
such as the UK Biobank, which aims to collect 500 000
blood samples from individuals aged between 45 and
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69 years, again to discover associations between genetic
factors and common diseases such as heart disease and
cancer (for example, see Parliamentary Office of Science
and Technology, 2002). Another kind of association study
may be carried out on groups of individuals affected by a
specific disorder. For example, as part of a randomised con-
trolled clinical trial of a new drug, a pharmacogenetic arm
may be added to establish links between genetic factors
and adverse reactions (see Chadwick, 2001). Analogously,
population-wide or disease-specific nutrigenomic research
could be envisaged.
While it is one aim of the UK Biobank to collect both
genetic and environmental information in order to study
the causes of common diseases in adult life, establishing
links between genetic factors and responses to diet will
arguably be more difficult than establishing genetic links
with adverse drug reactions. For some time the national
dietary surveys have been examining the link between food
intake and nutritional status, as indicated through the
collection and analysis of blood samples. These surveys
have been controversial precisely because they involved
the collection of blood samples from healthy individuals.
Where the acquisition of genetic information is at stake,
the issues become even more complex. Collection and
storage of genetic information in a database gives rise
to questions about control, access and use of that
information.
Participation in association studies and genetic databases
An issue for research ethics committees looking at national
dietary surveys has been whether or not individuals give
voluntary informed consent. In the case of contributing to
genetic research resulting in the establishment of a genetic
database, there have been queries about whether such
consent is even possible (Chadwick, 2001; House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2001).
First, there are issues about public awareness; to what
extent do participants and potential participants understand
what they are being asked to participate in? Their under-
standing should not be explained in terms of knowledge of
genetics per se. Arguably it is possible for an individual
to understand the issues affecting their interests without
having a detailed scientific knowledge. Indeed, there is
empirical evidence to suggest a good deal of lay under-
standing of what the relevant considerations are (Kerr et al.
1998).
Rather, the point is that in the case of establishing
genetic databases, no one really understands what they
might lead to, including the researchers. Participants may
be giving their samples at a time when the ethical and
regulatory framework is at a relatively early stage of devel-
opment, so they are being asked to consent in a context
of unpredictability. Furthermore, in the case of genetic
research, the nature of the risks and benefits is different,
what may harm individuals is not an intervention in itself,
but the potential uses and abuses of the information
discovered from their samples. In this context there have
been suggestions that relying on individualistic ethics
such as the doctrine of informed consent may be a
mistake. A draft report of the World Health Organization
(2001) has stated: ‘The justification for a database is more
likely to be grounded in communal value, and less on
individual gain . . . it leads to the question whether the
individual can remain of paramount importance in this
context. . . . The achievement of optimal advances in the
name of the collective good may require a reconsideration
of the respective claims so as to achieve an appropriate
balance between individual and collective interests, includ-
ing those of ethnic minorities, from a multi-cultural
perspective’.
In this situation the development of alternative ethical
frameworks, such as solidarity and equity (Chadwick &
Berg, 2001), and conceptions of gift and benefit-sharing
(Human Genome Organisation Ethics Committee, 2000)
are increasingly being seen. The point of these frameworks
is to try to introduce the idea that databases are common
goods to which there is a moral reason to contribute, as an
act of reciprocity for the benefits they bring. Indeed, the
language of ‘global public goods’ has been applied to
genomics (Thorsteinsdoˆttir et al. 2003) and to genetic
databases (Human Genome Organisation Ethics Commit-
tee, 2002). Global public goods are defined as goods that
are both non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. They are, in
other words, enjoyable by all without detriment to others.
Knowledge has been said to be the archetypal public good.
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to examine the
extent to which this concept is fair. For present purposes
the point is that, by extension, genomic knowledge, as
contained for example in genetic databases, has been
argued to be a global public good. This claim thus provides
the basis for the further argument that it provides a
moral reason, but not necessarily an overriding one, for
individuals to contribute to them, given certain protections
of individual interests, such as privacy.
Information, access and control
Privacy has been generally considered to be a principal
potential concern in relation to genetic databases. Where
information relevant to individuals is stored, and its use
could be detrimental to their interests, questions immedi-
ately arise about who has access to it. This issue is
important, not only in relation to worries about access by
third parties who might want to misuse it. For example,
suppose that at some point in the future it is common for
nutritionists to give individualised dietary advice based
on individual differences at the genetic level. The need to
consider the potential impact on the professional role
of the nutritionist has already been mentioned in general.
To be more specific, how would the nutritionist get
access to this information? Should it be envisaged that a
test would be requested at the time of consultation? Or
would there be access to a large population database?
Or again, would all individuals carry a ‘smart card’
containing their genetic profile? It is the latter scenario
that might be supposed to give maximum control to the
individual over their genetic information. Large population
databases need controls relating to who has access and on
what terms, and arguably leave less room for exercising
individual autonomy.
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Autonomy
Autonomy is a concept that arises in the majority of
discussions about ethics. Perhaps the most common
application of the notion of autonomy in the food context
is in connection with consumer choice (choice as to what
food to buy and consume). Interpretations of autonomy are
multiple, however, and it is worth trying to tease out some
differences that might be relevant to the nutrition context.
How autonomy is understood, in nutrition as in other
contexts, depends on the underlying theoretical perspective,
which may not always be transparent. From a utilitarian
perspective, individuals are deemed to make choices in
order to maximise their own happiness or to maximise the
extent to which their preferences may be satisfied. The most
important versions require that preferences be informed
preferences. Thus, on this model consumers are seen as
benefiting, by having information that will enable them to
make and act on choices that are most likely to maximise
satisfaction. In the context of food, however, nutritionists
know only too well that having information about what
food is most likely to contribute to health has to compete
with other facts, such as the seductive allure of ‘bad’
foods. There is no constraint that enables us to say that
informed preferences will be reflected in healthy choices,
rather than choices for pleasure.
If such a constraint is wanted, it is necessary to turn to
a competing idea of autonomy, as expressed in the notion
of making the rational choice, where ‘rational’ means
not maximising the satisfaction of an individual’s prefer-
ences, but acting in accordance with what the chooser
could will everyone in that situation to choose. This
interpretation takes its historical roots from the philosophy
of Immanuel Kant, first published in 1782 (see Beck, 1963).
Thus, if, for the sake of argument, it is known that certain
foods are detrimental to health, there are grounds for
thinking that an autonomous Kantian agent would not
take them. Surely, the rational agent could not consistently
will that everyone knowingly chooses to eat foods that
would be likely to shorten life, e.g. by increasing health
risks such as obesity. Kant himself, in expounding his
philosophical position, said relatively little specifically
about food, but he did have quite a bit to say about an
individual’s duties towards their body. What he did say
about food is indicative (although, confronted with an
increase in binge drinking and associated violent incidents,
it may appear today to be no more than quaint), as in the
following extract:
‘. . . the body must be frugal in its needs and temperate
in its pleasures . . . We must be frugal in eating and
drinking . . . with regard to food, men may be led to
over-eat even when the food is bad. To depart . . . from
the path of moderation is a breach of our duty to
ourselves. . . . Which of the two vices, gluttony or
drunkenness, is the more contemptible and the baser?
Gluttony is the baser of the two, for drink promotes
sociability and conversation, and inspires man . . .
[gluttony] is far baser, because it neither promotes
sociability, nor does it enliven the body, but is purely
bestial’ (see Beck, 1963).
It would be a mistake, however, to present the issue
for today’s consumers as a choice between making food
decisions either as utility maximisers or as Kantian agents.
It is important to distinguish between specific (local)
eating choices (I want this hamburger now) and making
more global choices about what sort of food to eat (I will
not eat veal). There is another sense to the notion of making
an autonomous choice, and that relates to choosing in
relation to an identity. Individuals not only make choices
about what to do in particular situations, they also choose,
at least to some extent, what sort of person they want to be
and this choice is expressed to a large extent through food.
Individuals make statements about themselves when they
choose to be vegetarian, to patronise Macdonalds, to diet
or to embrace obesity.
This issue of choice will also be important in the context
of genetics and food. It has been seen in relation to GM
food; now it should be considered whether individuals
want to be the type of person who, as a way of life, takes
genetic tests before deciding what to eat. Here, again, there
is a potential difference between pharmacogenomics and
nutrigenomics. In the case of pharmacogenomics, individ-
uals who are already in a patient role will be prescribed
medication in accordance with their genetic condition.
Perhaps the same situation will apply in the nutritional
context for individuals who are constructed as self- or
other-referred patients. Of course, as with any advice of
this sort, there is a potential problem about compliance
or adherence to a specific regimen. However, when the
potential for public health is considered, is it reasonable
to suppose that individual consumers will choose, on a
sizable scale, to make purchases in the light of genetic
information, when the items in question are in a super-
market competing with many others?
The answer would seem to depend much more on
construing oneself as a certain sort of person than on
what is a rational choice. Furthermore, there is evidence to
suggest that in the food context there is a great deal of
anxiety associated with genetics that has precisely the
effect of discouraging individuals from taking the genetic
route. Although the anxiety might with good cause be laid
at the door of GM food rather than genetic testing, it is
arguably genetics itself that has become associated with
public worries and concerns. This point is not new.
Deborah Lupton (1996), in Food, the Body and the Self,
drew attention to the ways in which anxiety leads to the
reinforcement of distinctions between the ‘natural’ and the
‘artificial’, and an increased tendency to seek comfort in
the natural and familiar. The author states: ‘In the context
of a climate of risk and uncertainty, being able to hold on
to such binary oppositions and their moral associations
makes it easier to live one’s everyday life’.
In addition to the worries about genetics there is the
potential for raising anxiety through misinterpretation of
information about individual risk. This prospect will be an
issue in both individual testing and in public health.
Public health: screening
When considering public health interventions, what is at
stake might be population screening rather than individual
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testing. Genetic screening is typically defined as the
determination of the prevalence of a gene in an asymp-
tomatic population or population group, where for any
given individual there is no reason to believe that he or she
has the gene in question. It is normally contrasted with the
genetic testing of an individual for whom there may be
some reason to think he or she is at risk (Chadwick, 1998).
If nutrigenomics is ever to be implemented in public
health, where can ethical guidelines be found? There are
general guidelines available on DNA sampling (Human
Genome Organisation, 1998) and on genetic databases
(Human Genome Organisation, 2002), but what is needed
is a way of assessing when applications of nutrigenomics
in public health would be worthwhile.
The Wilson & Jungner (1968) principles on screening
generally have been applied in the genetic context to estab-
lish under what circumstances it is appropriate to introduce
population genetic screening. There will be no attempt to
give an exhaustive discussion of all the criteria in this
context, but two of the most important criteria are that the
condition sought should be an ‘important problem’ and
that there must be an acceptable treatment. In the context
of genetics, ‘treatment’ has been interpreted widely to
mean that there must be some ‘scope for action’ available.
Population screening for phenylketonuria clearly satisfies
these criteria. Phenylketonuria is a serious disorder that
can be treated with a diet low in phenylalanine (Gu¨tter &
Guldberg, 2003).
Phenylketonuria, however, is a single gene disorder. It
is not the case that most of the information coming out of
research in nutrigenetics and nutrigenomics will be of this
type. What is at stake will concern individual risk factors
and predispositions. Thus, the question arises as to the
circumstances under which it would be appropriate to
undertake population-wide programmes involving genetic
information, in order to achieve public health targets. A
possible example, which is arguably identified as an
important health problem, will be considered.
Obesity
It is now generally accepted that there is a national (and
indeed international) problem with obesity. This problem
has been traced to well-recognised causes such as over-
eating and the ‘couch potato’ lifestyle. The ‘mystery’ of
the prevalence of slimness in France, in the light of dietary
patterns, has been attributed, among other factors, to
portion sizes and to the protective effect of red wine
(Defeat Diabetes Association, 2003). However, suppose it
was found that there was a genetic variant, call it variant
A, that predisposed to obesity when combined with food
Y. At what point would it be worth carrying out population
screening for variant A, as opposed to giving generic
dietary and lifestyle advice? The scope for action, in the
event of a positive result, would be to counsel those so
diagnosed that they had a higher-than-average risk and
then give dietary advice specific to their situation.
There are different aspects to the judgment about
whether the genetic screening is worth doing. First, there
are both advantages and disadvantages to undertaking
the screening (Shickle & Chadwick, 1994). Even putting
aside the issue of false negatives and false positives, there
is a concern that those identified as negative may feel able
to eat anything they like with impunity. There is a parallel
to be drawn here with the cases of smoking and alcohol.
Not everyone who smokes will contract lung cancer, not
every drinker will succumb to alcoholism. There are
differences between individuals at the genetic level, which
affect their risks of these outcomes. It is easy to understand
the attractions to an individual who likes smoking of being
given the ‘all-clear’ to the relevant genetic predisposing
factors. However, that does not mean that there will be no
other deleterious effects as a result of smoking cigarettes.
This situation is where potential problems about interpret-
ing risk information become relevant.
Functional foods
Another possible application of nutrigenomic and nutri-
genetics might be in relation to ‘functional foods’; but
surely, it might be argued, all food is functional in some
sense. This reasoning indicates the need to be more precise
about what exactly is meant by ‘functional’. Functional
foods are those that have, or claim to have, a specific
health-promoting or enhancing effect over and above their
nutritional content (see Chadwick et al. 2003). On this
basis they are arguably closer to drugs than to foods as
conventionally understood. Products currently on the
market include cholesterol-lowering foods and probiotic
yoghurts.
There have been a number of ethical concerns associ-
ated with functional foods, arising partly from the fact that,
being foods, they are tested for safety but not for efficacy,
unlike drugs. They are placed in supermarkets alongside
traditional products and yet they might not be suitable for
all those who buy and consume them. The way in which
they are advertised, moreover, is potentially misleading,
using role models, for example, who are apparently not
in the relevant high-risk group, to eat the products in
TV advertisements. As the range of products including
particular ingredients increases, there are further concerns
about overdosing, e.g. in the case of children’s diets. As
the regulatory system approves these products on a case-
by-case basis, there are clear difficulties about how to
control the global effect on diet.
As noted earlier, currently food and drugs are regulated
differently, which reflects views about the essential dif-
ferences between them. One purported difference is that
while food is a necessary requirement of survival of
the whole organism, even in the absence of ill-health,
pharmaceuticals contribute to survival in so far as they
target specific processes when healthy functioning is
damaged or at risk.
For functional foods the case for using genetic infor-
mation to inform dietary advice may be stronger than that
for other foods. They are foods introduced into the
market with a specific health-promoting claim, but as their
number increases it may be important to have regulatory
mechanisms that ensure they are used in the intended
manner. As the boundary between food and drugs is
increasingly undermined, their regulation will, arguably,
increasingly need to consider both safety and effectiveness.
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In so far as they are more akin to drugs, the issues will
become closer to those in pharmacogenomics, as what
will be assessed will be susceptibility to benefit from
well-characterised ingredients.
Conclusion
The extent of the role that nutrigenetics and nutrigenomics
will play in individual and public health is unclear. In so
far as they do have a role to play, however, there will
inevitably be associated ethical issues. Those issues
concerning individuals cannot be fully distinguished from
those of public health, as both will depend on collective
action in the form of association studies and databases.
This link in turn leads to questioning the reliance on indi-
vidualistic models of ethics, and in particular of autonomy
and informed consent. At the very least the interpretation
of autonomy is not transparent. Individuals make food
choices for a variety of reasons, in part expressing their
sense of identity. Much depends, ethically, on the mech-
anisms of intervention: how will individuals be tested and
who will control the information? The challenges for the
professional roles of nutritionists need careful thought, in
relation to their role in genetic testing and conveying
genetic information. Where public health is concerned
guidelines are needed as to the circumstances in which it
would be worthwhile to undertake population screening, as
what is at stake is likely not to be clear-cut disorders such
as phenylketonuria, but risk information with all the
associated problems of accuracy and interpretation. Func-
tional foods may provide an example of where nutri-
genomics and nutrigenetics may be particularly useful and
offer added value over and above generalised dietary
advice. Functional foods take us closer to pharmaceuticals,
where establishing a link between genetic factors and
response may be easier to establish.
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